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AGE DISCRIMINATION IN NEW YORK'S MEDICAID BENEFIT
PAYMENT RECOUPMENT STATUTE
INTRODUCTION
In 1966, the State of New York instituted its Medicaid Pro-
gram. This program, while allowing aid recipients to retain owner-
ship of certain assets, provided for recovery of benefit payments by
means of a lien placed against their estate.1 This recoupment is
limited by New York Social Services Law § 369, subd. 1(b) which
provides as follows:
1. All provisions of this chapter not inconsistent with this title shall be
applicable to medical assistance for needy persons and the administration
thereof by the public welfare districts. Any inconsistent provision of this
chapter or other law notwithstanding .
(b) there shall be no adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance
correctly paid on behalf of such individual under this title, except from the
estate of an individual who was sixty-five years of age or older when he
received such assistance, and then only after the death of his surviving
spouse, if any, and only at a time when he has no surviving child who is
under twenty-one years of age or is blind or permanently and totally dis-
abled, provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall be construed to
prohibit any adjustment or recovery for medical assistance furnished pursu-
ant to subdivision three of section three hundred sixty-six of this chapter.
2
This Comment suggests that this provision, which allows re-
covery of expenditures from those who received assistance after
reaching age sixty-five, while prohibiting recovery from those who
received such assistance prior to reaching age sixty-five, is contrary
1. 1966 N.Y. Laws, chap. 256.
2. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 369 1(b) (McKinney) (1966) (emphasis added). It is notewor-
thy that the amount recovered pursuant to this section is a very small fraction of the total
cost of the program. The projected state and federal assistance to the program alone
amounts to over $2.6 billion for fiscal year 1980-81. See STATE OF NEW YORK EXEcUTIVE
BUDGET FOR THE FiscAL YEAR APRIL 1, 1980 TO MARCH 31, 1981, REPORT 430. Of this amount
it was estimated that about $10 million would be recovered due to auditing activities of the
Department of Social Services. Id. This auditing activity included not only recovery under
§ 369 1(b) but also actions pursuant to N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 366 3(a) (recovery from
responsible relatives who are absent or who refuse to provide assistance at the time of the
expenditures) and § 366 3(b) (recovery of incorrectly paid assistance). Therefore, only a very
small percentage of the total Medicaid expenditures are recovered under § 369 1(b).
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to public policy and would not withstand a modern equal protec-
tion analysis under the fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution3 or article I § 11 of the New York State Consti-
tution.' Although the statute has been challenged in New York,
the courts have not yet disposed of the constitutional question.5
I. HISTORY OF NEW YORK'S MEDICAID PROGRAM AND SECTION 369
1(B).
New York's Medicaid Program was enacted to bring the state
into compliance with the provisions of Title XIX of the Federal
Social Security Act of 1965.6 This cooperative federal-state pro-
gram evolved from earlier medical assistance legislation.7 Its prede-
cessor, the Kerr-Mills Program of Medical Assistance to the Aged,
beginning in 1960 gave the states a chance to obtain matching fed-
eral grants for expenditures used to meet the medical expenses of
elderly citizens. Many of these citizens had previously been ineligi-
ble for help." The intent of the Kerr-Mills plan was to provide
health services to those aged individuals who, although not eligible
3. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. No person shall be denied the equal protection of this state or any subdivision
thereof. No person shall, because of race, color, creed or religion, be subjected to
any discrimination in his civil rights by any other person or by any firm, corpo-
ration, or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdividion of the state.
N.Y. CONsT. art. 1, § 1 (McKinney) (1969).
5. See, e.g., Scarpuzza v. Blum, 73 A.D.2d 237, 426 N.Y.S.2d 505 (2d Dept. 1980) (peti-
tioner lacked standing to consider the constitutional question since the issue at hand had
been settled by statutory determination); Matter of the Estate of Harris, 88 Misc. 2d 60, 387
N.Y.S.2d 796 (1976) (Surrogate's Court, Wayne County, found on statutory grounds that the
Department of Social Services was not entitled to reimbursement from a widow's estate for
Medicaid correctly paid to her husband during his lifetime. In doing so the court avoided
the constitutional issue).
6. Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286, H.R. 6675 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq.
(1965)).
7. An excellent summary of the Title XIX legislation can be found in [1979] MEDICARE
AND MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 14,010; and in DATA ON THE MEDICAID PROGRAM: ELIGIBILITY,
SERVICES, EXPENDITURES 1-2 (rev. ed. 1979).
8. REPORT BY THE SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON HEALTH OF THE ELDERLY TO THE SPECIAL
COMMITTEE ON AGING, MEDICAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE AGED (THE KERR-MILLS PROGRAM 1960-
1963), 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1963).
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for welfare, were unable to afford them.9 Unfortunately, the Kerr-
Mills plan proved to be ineffective.10 Title XIX was enacted in
hopes of correcting the deficiencies of its predecessor.
The new program expanded eligibility by requiring those
states implementing the plan to include the categorically needy
and, at the state's option, the medically needy.'1 In New York, eli-
gibility is further expanded by adding all those on public assis-
tance12 and those who are stricken with catastrophic illness.13
According to Title XIX, a state is not required to establish a
Medicaid program, but should it choose to do so, the program
must conform to federal guidelines in order to obtain matching
funding. 4 Section 1396(a)(18) of Title 42 of the United States
Code severely limits the circumstances under which states can de-
mand recoupment of its expenditures from aid recipients and their
relatives."' It was under the enabling authority of this section that
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1-8. Among the several defects of the Kerr-Mills program were: (1) only
slightly more than half of the states had instituted a program; (2) stringent eligibility tests,
lien provisions, and responsible relative provisions discouraged participation in the program;
(3) benefit levels varied widely from state to state; (4) high administrative costs; (5) grossly
disproportionate distribution of federal matching funds since wealthier states were best able
to finance their phase of the program; (6) states had distorted congressional intent by trans-
ferring persons already receiving welfare assistance to the Kerr-Mills program in order to
take advantage of the higher matching grant provisions; and, (7) reduced participation due
to aspects such as cumbersome investigations and depletion requirements.
11. The "categorically needy" includes those eligible to receive cash benefits through
one of the existing welfare programs established by the Social Security Act (Aid to Families
with Dependent Children and Supplemental Security Income). The "medically needy" are
those who fit into one of the categories of people covered by the federal cash welfare pro-
grams (aged, blind, or disabled individuals, or members of families with dependent children
when one parent is absent, incapacitated, or unemployed), but are ineligible for welfare be-
cause they have enough income to pay for their basic living expenses. If the state deems that
their income is insufficient to pay for their medical expenses, they fall within the class. DATA
ON THE MEDICAID PROGRAM, supra note 5, at 1.
12. In New York, public assistance includes both the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children and Home Relief programs.
13. The "catastrophic illness" eligibility can be claimed by any person otherwise ineligi-
ble who incurs qualifying medical expenses in excess of twenty-five percent of annual net
income, or the amount of such income in excess of public assistance levels, whichever sum is
smaller. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, PUBLICATION No. 1006, April, 1978.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a) (1965).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a) (18) provided that:
(a)... A state plan for medical assistance must ... (18) provide that no lien
may be imposed against the property of an individual prior to his death on ac-
count of medical assistance paid or to be paid on his behalf under the plan (ex-
cept pursuant to the judgment of a court on account of benefits incorrectly paid
250 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30
New York's § 369 1(b) was formulated.
II. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
One rationale Congress found for limiting the states in this
manner was to eliminate the hardships created by requiring certain
individuals to pay for the support and medical care of their rela-
tives."6 Although Congress felt that it was proper to expect spouses
to support each other and for parents to be held responsible for
the support of minor children and those who are permanently and
totally disabled, it concluded that support requirements beyond
these degrees of relationship were harmful to the family unit.17
The legislative history of the recovery statute gives no explicit pol-
icy reason for the "over 65" distinction. In fact, the reports indi-
cate that the lien provided for in Title XIX is simply a narrowing
of the recovery statute enacted under the Kerr-Mills Medical As-
sistance for the Aged Program.18 Since the Kerr-Mills plan was
available exclusively to citizens aged sixty-five or older, this could
serve as one possible explanation for the age classification in the
current statute.
In adopting its Medicaid Program, the New York State Legis-
lature stated that its intent was to meet all necessary federal re-
quirements under the Social Security Act and not risk the loss of
on behalf of such individual), and that there shall be no adjustment or recovery
(except, in the case of an individual who was 65 years of age or older when he
received such assistance, from his estate, and then only after the death of his
surviving spouse, if any, and only at a time when he had no surviving child who
is under age 21 or (with respect to States eligible to participate in the State
program established under subchapter XVI of this chapter), is blind or perma-
nently and totally disabled, or is blind or disabled as defined in section 1382c of
this title (with respect to states which are not eligible to participate in such
program)) of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of such individual
under the plan.
16. Many earlier welfare programs would not allow government expenditures if certain
relatives were financially able to provide for the needs of the individuals.
17. See [1965] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1943, 2018.
18. The Kerr-Mills recovery statute is 42 U.S.C. § 302 (a)(11)(E) (repealed by Pub. L.
No. 92-603 effective Jan. 1, 1974, except with respect to Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin
Islands). This provision limited recovery to a lien against the estate of the deceased recipi-
ent, and then only after the death of his spouse. The title XIX provision which replaced
§ 302 (a)(11)(E) further limited the possibility of recoupment by forbidding recovery from a
recipient who received his assistance before attaining age 65 or who was survived by a child
under the age of 21.
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federal reimbursement. 19 Nevertheless, this fails to explain the
substance of § 369 1(b). The Social Security Act merely allows
states to implement a scheme to recover expenditures; it does not
require it. Many states have no such recovery statutes.2 0
In fact, New York's recovery provision seems to exist despite,
rather than in light of, current public policy. Society is rediscover-
ing that the elderly should be treated with respect rather than as
marginal human beings. Governmental policies should strive to re-
affirm this commitment to human dignity. Yet laws such as § 369
1(b) punish, rather than reward, the elderly for a long and produc-
tive life. The image of retirement and the "golden years" seems
much less rosy when a person is faced with being forced out of
work, living on a fixed income, and having to make the difficult
decision of either forsaking needed medical assistance or risking a
government lien on his estate.
This "over 65 provision" actually undermines the intent of the
federal limitation on recovery statutes. Rather than facing the
prospect of not being able to pass on to loved ones the remainder
of their meager estates, many of the elderly refuse to apply for the
public assistance which they so desperately need.2 This psycholog-
ical burden is further magnified by the fact that the lion's share of
a Medicaid recipient's estate normally consists of the individual's
home.22 Although the younger generation seems little bothered by
19. Matter of the Estate of Harris, 88 Misc. 2d 60, 387 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1976). See note 5
supra.
20. In re Estate of Colon, 83 Misc. 2d 344, 346, 372 N.Y.S.2d 812, 818 (Surr. Ct. Kings
Co. 1975).
21. LEGAL RESEARCH AND SERVICES FOR THE ELDERLY, NATIONAL COUNCIL OF SENIOR
CITIZENS, INC., LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE ELDERLY: A HANDBOOK OF
MODEL STATE STATUTES, 110-11 (1971). The study recommends the adoption of the following
statute:
Section 2. No liens or claims on property of Applicants or Recipients
(a) No department, agency, or other subdivision of this State, or represen-
tative of any of them, shall attach a lien or make a claim on the property of
any applicant for or recipient of old age assistance for the propose of secur-
ing reimbursement of old age assistance granted.
(b) All liens attached or claims made on the property of applicants for or
recipients of old age assistance by any department, agency or other subdivi-
sion of this State, or by any representative of any of old age assistance
granted are hereby released. Notation of this release shall be made on en-
cumbered titles by the department, agency or other subdivision of the State
responsible for placing the encumbrance on the title.
22. "Time and again, throughout this committee's hearings and in all parts of the coun-
try, older people made it obvious that anything which in any way threatened their sense of
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living in a heavily mortgaged home, to the elderly, owning a home
that is free of all encumbrances is often all that remains of their
dignity and sense of independence.2 3
Another rationale for limiting recovery provisions is that a lien
placed upon a recipient's assets would only prove to be a disincen-
tive for that person to ever strive for economic stability and thus
remove himself from the welfare rolls. With this in mind, the legis-
lature, by using the age distinction found in § 369 1(b), seems to be
creating a presumption that at age 65, a person has reached the
point where he would no longer be able to extricate himself from
financial difficulties. Again this flies in the face of rational public
policy. Increasing life expectancy will prove of little, if any, use if
the law eliminates any incentive for a person to remain a produc-
tive individual. The image of the elderly worker as a burden on his
employer has proved to be a false stereotype. The preponderance
of gerontological research has shown no valid reason to distinguish
the over 65 worker from his under 65 counterpart on the basis of
free and outright ownership of the homes they had struggled to make their own was intoler-
able." Supra note 8, at 34.
23. Those of the younger generation who proudly lay claim to "ownership" of
heavily mortgaged homes in suburbia may find this idea strange and difficult to
understand. Its existence is nonetheless a fact, and a most important fact for the
Congress to keep in mind in evaluating programs designed to aid the elderly in a
way that will not outrage their sense of decency and dignity.
These older people with whom we are concerned grew up and matured in a
tradition of rugged Americanism in which home ownership was an objective of
paramount importance. To them "ownership" meant - and still means just that
- outright ownership, free and clear. "Paying off the mortgage" was the goal in
life for every couple. Its achievement, whether the home was valued at $5,000,
$10,000 or $50,000 meant that one had proved himself, had acquired the status
of a respectable, responsible, "solid" citizen.
To many of our older citizens, the home they own represents the totality of
their life savings. This is important of course. But even more important is the
fact that with income low or nonexistent, with friends dead or moved away,
without the satisfaction that comes with employment, an older person's owner-
ship of his home becomes to him the last remaining vestige of dignity, of security
and of independence. These are all too often all that gives life meaning in old
age. To rob an older person of dignity, of independence, and of the feeling of
security, is to make of his life a mockery. The Kerr-Mills Act, itself, does not
threaten to take away the home. A claim on one's home enforcible after death
does not take that house away. Yet to the elderly, it seems to. To permit the
state "to take a mortgage" on the home - whether it is or is not a mortgage in
fact - is to admit defeat in life.
Supra note 8, at 34.
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either work ability or contribution to the employer.24
Since the inception of the Medicaid Program, Congress has
tightened the eligibility requirements. At the same time, the New
York Legislature has shown a constant concern that the program is
becoming too costly.25 Even though the financial savings from re-
coupment is minimal,2" this concern makes it doubtful that the leg-
islature, on its own initiative, will repeal the recovery provision.
Only judicial intervention will eliminate this "arbitrary quality of
thoughtlessness" that our constitutional scheme was designed to
prevent. Litigation based on the equal protection clauses of both
the federal and state constitutions would be the most effective
means of eliminating this discrimination.
III. EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
When courts consider present day equal protection claims
they apply one of three standards of review in determining the
constitutionality of a statute. These standards are: (1) "strict scru-
tiny"; (2) the traditional rational basis test; and (3) the "middle
tier" or "minimum scrutiny with a bite" test.2 The argument
against the validity of § 369 1(b) will be evaluated under each level
of scrutiny.
A. Strict Scrutiny Analysis
Courts invoke the strict scrutiny analysis whenever a funda-
mental interest or right is infringed upon or when a detrimental
classification is based upon a suspect class of individuals. 29 A per-
suasive argument can be made that this age classification should
be judged according to this level of inquiry.
Although the United States Supreme Court held in Massachu-
setts Board of Retirement v. Murgia ° that age is not an inherently
24. Note, Age Discrimination in Employment, 47 So. CALIF. L. REV. 1311 (1974).
25. See 101ST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK BOARD OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND NEW
YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, No ONE CAN STOP IT - EXCEPT US (1967).
26. See STATE OF NEW YORK EXECUTIVE BUDGET, supra note 2.
27. Hobsen v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 497 (D.D.C. 1967).
28. An excellent history and analysis of the three standards of review can be found in
GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 657-65 (9th ed. 1975).
29. Id. at 658.
30. 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam).
1981]
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suspect classification,31 the classification found in the present situ-
ation is distinguishable and deserves reconsideration. The age clas-
sification in § 369 1(b) places elderly Medicaid recipients into a
"discrete and insular" group in need of extraordinary protection
from the majoritarian political process.-2 Unlike Murgia, where the
disadvantaged group consisted of middle aged government employ-
ees,33 this statute discriminates against a class of elderly individu-
als who, by definition, are impoverished to the degree that they are
medically needy. 4 Age combined with poverty, unlike some other
classifications, is not an elective status from which one can escape
by choice. 5 Section 369 1(b) presents a case where a majority gov-
ernment passes a law which is not benign, but is outwardly detri-
mental to the rights of a small, disadvantaged segment of the
population, politically powerless because of its size and impover-
ishment.36 Although the state has a valid interest in recovering ex-
penditures, that interest bears none of the "pressing public neces-
sity" that is required in order to justify a suspect classification.38
31. In a per curiam decision, the Court utilized the traditional rational basis test to
uphold the age classification. Although other cases have presented the question of age classi-
fication, courts have generally relied upon Murgia as conclusive evidence that age, by itself,
is not a suspect class.
32. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
33. Murgia concerned the mandatory retirement of Massachusetts State Police at age
50. It can be argued that the age classification in Murgia is based upon a greater public
necessity due to the lessened physical ability of most men over age 50. This lessened ability
might be considered to be a factor in adequately performing their duties as policemen. The
age classification in § 369 1(b) bears no such public protection rationale and seems to exist
solely for financial reasons. See also text accompanying notes 30 & 31 supra.
34. See note 11 & accompanying text supra.
35. Alienage, religion, citizenship, and political affiliation are all examples of statuses
which are elective. It should be noted that the Supreme Court has not refrained from de-
claring even elective statuses to be suspect. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971),
where the Court found alienage to be an inherently suspect classification.
36. The Supreme Court has defined a suspect class as one that is saddled with such
disabilities as to be relegated to a position of being politically powerless. San Antonio School
District v. Rodriquez, 441 U.S. 1 (1973). This quality distinguishes the improverished aged
from other non-elective statuses, such as gender, which the court declined to declare suspect
in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
37. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). In Korematsu, the Court
held that wartime emergency justified different treatment of a suspect class. It is unlikely
that the possibility of recovering a small percentage of expenditures would reach such a high
level of necessity.
38. "The state. . . may legitimately attempt to limit its expenditures, whether for pub-
lic assistance, public education, or any program. But a state may not accomplish such a
purpose by invidious distinctions between classes of its citizens. . . . The saving of welfare
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The age classification found in § 369 1(b) also fails on the
grounds that it infringes upon a fundamental right guaranteed by
the New York State Constitution. Unlike the Federal Constitu-
tion which recognizes no fundamental right in public assistance,
article 17 of the state constitution mandates the public care and
support of the needy.40 The dual purposes of this article are evi-
dent from the comments made by Edward F. Corsi, Chairman of
the Committee on Social Welfare, in moving the adoption of this
provision by the Constitutional Convention:
Here are the words which set forth a definite policy of government, a
concrete social obligation which no court may ever misread. By this section,
the committee hopes to achieve two purposes: First: to remove from the area
of constitutional doubt the responsibility of the state to those who must look
to society for the bare necessities of life; and secondly, to set down explicitly
in our basic law a much needed definition of the relationship of the people to
their government.
The legislature may continue the system of relief now in operation ....
It may devise new ways of dealing with the problem. Its hands are untied.
What it may not do is to shirk its responsibility which, in the opinion of the
committee, is as fundamental as any responsibility of government."1
A supremacy clause argument is uhpersuasive in advocating
the validity of this statute. The fact that the Federal Constitution
recognizes no fundamental right to public assistance is irrelevant
where the issue at hand is the rights secured by the state constitu-
tion.'2 Similarly, one cannot claim that the obligation to provide
costs cannot justify an otherwise invidious classification." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 633 (1969).
39. See N.Y. CONsT. art. 17, § 1 (McKinney) (1969).
40. "The aid, care and support of the needy are public concerns and shall be provided
by the state and by such of its subdivisions, and in such a manner and by such means, as
the legislature may from time to time determine." N.Y. CONsT. art. 17 § 1 (McKinney)
(1969).
By classifying certain groups as eligible for Medicaid, the legislature has deemed these
people to be "needy". gee note 11 & accompanying text supra. Section 369 1(b) discrimi-
nates against certain of these individuals based not upon need but upon age.
41. REVISED RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, Vol. III, 2126 (1938). Evi-
dence that article 17 was intended to include state responsibility for health care can be
found in HINDMAN, THE NEW YORK CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1938, THE CONSTITUENT
PROCESS AND INTEREST AcTIviTY 263-68 (1938).
42. Lee v. Smith, 43 N.Y.2d 453, 373 N.E.2d 247, 402 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1977), aff'g 87
Misc. 2d 1018, 187 N.Y.S.2d 952 (Special Term N.Y. Co. 1976) (statute denying eligibility
for a state assistance program solely on the grounds that the individual is eligible for assis-
tance under a federal program is violative of equal protection insofar as it denies the indi-
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medical assistance is dismissed due to the federal participation in
the program. The state's duty remains and cannot be avoided by
assigning the needy to a federally funded program.43
A strong argument could be made that no fundamental right
has been violated in this situation because the statute does not
deny assistance to any individual, it merely requires the recovery
from his estate of benefits accrued to him during his lifetime. Nev-
ertheless, it is obvious that those sixty-five or older are paying a
price for such assistance as compared to those who are similarly
situated but who are under age sixty-five. The effect of § 369 1(b)
is to force elderly recipients to make a crucial decision: either they
must forfeit their consitutionally guaranteed right to public medi-
cal assistance, or pay the price by sacrificing their ability to be-
queath to loved ones their estate unencumbered by liens. The
legislature should not be able to mandate such a decision where it
concerns such a fundamental constitutional privilege. This consti-
tutes differing treatment of similarly situated individuals by statu-
tory classification; thus, there is a clear violation of equal
protection.
Even though it would be justified, it is doubtful that the
courts would resolve this issue by invoking strict scrutiny. Such a
resolution would be impractical. A finding of a suspect class or a
fundamental right would virtually eliminate the ability of the legis-
lature to make any classification in this important field of law."
B. Traditional "Mere Rationality" Test
Under the mere rationality test of equal protection, a statute
is upheld as constitutional if it rationally furthers some legitimate
state interest. As stated in Moore v. Nassau County Dept. of Pub-
lic Transportation,45 the purposes of § 369 1(b) are to give medical
assistance recipients a greater opportunity to become financially
vidual supplementation needed in order to reach the state determined subsistence level). C/.
Tucker v. Toia, 89 Misc. 2d 116, 390 N.Y.S.2d 794 (Sup. Ct. Monroe Co. 1977), aff'd 43
N.Y.2d 1, 371 N.E.2d 449, 400 N.Y.S.2d 728 (1977) (statute imposing additional eligibility
requirements upon those receiving aid pursuant to a state funded program but not upon
those under a similar federal program is violative of equal protection insofar as it raises
substantial barriers to efforts of some to receive assistance).
43. See note 42 supra.
44. The finding of a suspect class or an infringement of a fundamental right invalidates
all classifications unless a compelling state interest can be shown. See note 28 supra.
45. 78 Misc. 2d 1066, 1071, 357 N.Y.S.2d 652, 657 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co. 1974).
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independent and to avoid encumbering their property with liens in
return for medical aid furnished. This provides no rational justifi-
cation for treating two similarly situated recipients differently
merely because one is sixty-five years of age or older and one is
not. There may be a valid state interest in recovering expenditures,
but different treatment according to age does not further this
interest.
It is even questionable whether the statute is rational as a
means of cutting expenditures. For example, in many instances,
the estate might be so small that the cost to the state of enforcing
the claim is greater than the amount recovered. Yet by statute no
distinction is made for such a situation. By complicating and de-
laying the closing of these small estates, these liens also prove to
be a major inconvenience to the administrators. A statute should
not cause more problems than it solves.
It is possible to argue that there has been no denial of equal
protection since the state has declared that relatives, except for
spouses and parents of minor children, are not responsible for a
person's medical needs and in their place the state has assumed
this responsibility. Therefore, as "payment" for this service, the
state is entitled to recoupment of its expenditures. In effect, this
means that heirs have bargained away their rights to divide up an
unencumbered estate for the privilege of not being responsible for
their relatives' medical needs. But this is not the pertinent issue.
The discrimination inherent in § 369 1(b) is not against any legatee
under the will. The discriminatory effect is that Medicaid recipi-
ents sixty-five years of age or older lose their right to devise an
estate free from a Medicaid recovery lien while those under sixty-
five do not.
Classification by age under § 369 creates a vastly under-inclu-
sive category. For example, in 1976 only 36.5 % of the total medical
assistance expenditures were made to individuals aged sixty-five or
older.46 Thus, almost two-thirds of the payments were made with-
out any possibility for recovery. The amount actually recovered is
a very small percentage of the total expenditures. 47 Therefore, it
appears that the furtherance of a legitimate state interest is mini-
46. NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, MEDICAID 1976: THE LOCALLY
ADMINISTERED MEDICAL ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY PERSONS PROGRAM IN NEW YORK STATE,
PROGRAM ANALYSIS REPORT NUMBER 60 (Publication No. 1053) (1978).




C. "Middle Tier" or "Minimum Scrutiny with a Bite"
Modern equal protection analysis has taken a dramatic shift
due to the Burger Court's dissatisfaction with the traditional ap-
proaches whereby "strict scrutiny" led to virtual assurance that
the statute would be invalidated and "mere rationality" lent itself
to practically unchecked deferrence to legislative wishes.48 Both
the United States Supreme Court and the New York Court of Ap-
peals have in recent years adopted a middle level of judicial scru-
tiny in certain instances for equal protection cases. Although the
majority of the Supreme Court has not adopted this approach by
name, in several cases it has invalidated a law that did not sub-
stantially further a state interest.
49
The New York Court of Appeals has explicitly adopted and
utilized this level of scrutiny.50 Following the Court's lead, the
Supreme Court, Nassau County, in Board of Education Levittown
Union Free School District, Nassau County v. Nyquist,51 en-
nunciated the guidelines to be used for a middle tier analysis. Initi-
ally, it must be determined whether the challenged statutory dis-
criminations satisfies a substantial state interest. The
discriminatory treatment must have a basis in actuality and not be
merely conjectural. It must further some legitimate articulated
purpose. Then, if it is found that the statute serves such a purpose,
an examination must be made to determine if less objectionable
alternatives would adequately fulfill the governmental objective.
Section 369 1(b) does not survive this analysis. It falls in the
void between two irreconcilable governmental interests: to give
48. Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center, 39 N.Y.2d 326, 348 N.E.2d 537, 384 N.Y.S.2d
82 (1976). Justice Gabrielli of the N.Y. Court of Appeals, said:
[t]he inflexibility of the traditional equal protection approaches is readily appar-
ent for each is polarized and outcome-determinative. Modern day theorists, led
by Professor Gerlad Gunther (see Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-For-
ward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1) have detected a departure from the tradi-
tional approaches in recent precedent and argue, convincingly we think, that a
middle level of review presently exists.
39 N.Y.2d at 333-34, 348 N.E.2d at 543-44, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 88.
49. See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S.
636 (1975); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
50. 39 N.Y.2d 326, 348 N.E.2d 537, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1976).
51. 94 Misc. 2d 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co. 1978).
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Medicaid recipients a greater opportunity to become financially in-
dependent,52 and to recover governmental funds expended for the
health care of the recipient. The knowledge that any net worth
that an individual might have at death will not be devised but will
go to the state proves to be a great disincentive to efforts at be-
coming economically sound.
In effect, the state is using an age classification for administra-
tive convenience. Rather than making the more difficult determi-
nation of which individuals are likely to become financially inde-
pendent, it is presuming that for those sixty-five years of age or
older, the state interest in recouping its expenditures outweighs
the rights of the individual to devise an unencumbered estate.
Such a privilege might not be a fundamental right in the constitu-
tional sense, but is one of the interests considered most essential
by many older individuals.
The age classification in § 369 1(b) also suggests that there is
no state interest in giving the elderly a greater opportunity to
become financially independent. This could only be true if the
state presumes that an individual sixty-five or older who is receiv-
ing medical assistance will never obtain financial stability and thus
lose his eligibility for such assistance. This assumption is based on
an archaic and overbroad generalization not tolerated under the
Constitution. Presumptions such as these are not justified by
mere administrative convenience. 4 A state is forbidden by the Due
Process Clause to deprive an individual of his rights on the basis of
a permanent and irrebuttable presumption that is not necessarily
or universally true in fact when there are alternative means of
making the crucial determination.5 5 For example, a hearing to de-
termine the possibility of the recipient obtaining financial stability
would suffice to overcome this constitutional roadblock.
52. Moore v. Nassau County Dep't of Public Transportation, 78 Misc.2d 1066, 357
N.Y.S.2d 652 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co. 1974).
53. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975). Here the invidious distinction was
based on the generalization that male workers' earnings are vital to their families' support
while female workers' earnings are not. Similarly, the age distinction found in § 369 1(b) is
based on the overbroad generalization that Medicaid recipients over age 65 are no longer
capable of becoming financially sound.
54. United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
55. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (the State of Connecticut was forbidden by
the Due Process Clause from denying an individual resident tuition rates based on an ir-
rebuttable presumption of non-residence when the presumption was not necessarily or uni-
versally true in fact).
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Other non-discriminatory, more narrowly tailored alternatives
to the rigid age classification do exist. The state could declare that
the lien against the estate of the recipient will be released if the
individual loses his eligibility. With the use of this procedure, the
state's goal of having the recipient become financially independent
may also be realized.
Alternative legislation could also be used to nullify another ar-
gument for the age distinction. Since the value of a recipient's
home is not considered for eligibility purposes,56 it could be argued
that a lien provision is necessary to prevent an elderly recipient
from transferring all of his assets into a homestead and thus cir-
cumventing the asset limit for eligibility. On the contrary, a statu-
tory presumption against such transfers which would disqualify a
person from eligibility would eliminate this possibility while still
allowing the homestead exemption.
5 7
A court in considering this question should reject any hypoth-
esized purposes or state interests and base its scrutiny on articu-
lated purposes and the legislative history. Justice Brennan stated
in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,58 "[t]his court need not in equal pro-
tection cases accept'at face value assertions of legislative purposes,
when an examination of the legislative scheme and its history dem-
onstrates that the asserted purpose could not have been a goal of
the legislation." As discussed earlier, in the absence of any articu-
lated, rational explanation to the contrary, it would appear that
the age distinction found in § 369 1(b) is merely a carryover from
earlier Kerr-Mills assistance programs, 59 and bears no substantial
56. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 366 2(a)(1) (McKinney) (1966).
57. Although case law has not confirmed it, it is arguable that N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW
§ 366 1(e) has already eliminated the possibility of this type of circumvention of the asset
limit. Section 366 1(e) states that:
1. Medical assistance shall be given under this title to a person who requires
such assistance and who
(e) has not made a voluntary transfer of property (i) for the purpose of
qualifying for such assistance, or (ii) for the purpose of defeating any cur-
rent or future right to recovery of medical assistance paid, or for the pur-
pose of qualifying for, continuing eligibility for or increasing need for medi-
cal assistance. A transfer of property made within eighteen months prior to
the date of application shall be presumed to have been made for the pur-
pose specified in subparagraph (i) [to qualify for Medicaid]. . ..
58. 420 U.S. 636, 648 n.16 (1975).
59. See note 18 & accompanying text supra.
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relationship to any state interest concerning the present program.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has traditionally given legislative bodies a
great deal of deference in matters concerning economic and social
rights. On the other hand, statutes infringing upon an individual's
personal liberties such as the right to vote or the right to travel
have undergone a more painstaking examination."0 Yet in the last
decade the Court has questioned this doctrine. In Lynch v. House-
hold Finance Corporation,1 the Court said:
The dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a false one.
Property does not have rights. People have rights. The right to enjoy prop-
erty without law deprivation, no less than the right to speak or the right to
travel, is in truth, a "personal" right, whether the "property" in question be a
welfare check, a home, or a savings account. In fact, a fundamental interde-
pendence exists between the personal right to liberty and the personal right
to property. Neither could have meaning without the other. That rights on
property are basic civil rights has long been recognized.1
2
Furthermore, this statute is not purely economic in nature. As
Justice Marshall urged in his dissent in Richardson v. Belcher,a5
special attention should be paid to the individual interest at stake:
"Judges should not ignore what everybody knows, namely that leg-
islation regulating business cannot be equated to legislation deal-
ing with destitute, disabled or elderly individuals."
This line of reasoning has been evident in a series of Supreme
Court decisions striking down provisions of the Social Security and
welfare laws as violations of equal protection. 4 Similarly, the New
60. See GUNTHER, supra note 28, at 594.
61. 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
62. Id. at 552.
63. 404 U.S. 78, 90 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
64. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (Social Security Survivors benefits were
awarded to widowers only if they could prove that their wife provided at least one half of
their support. No such proof was required for widows.); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S.
636 (1975) (Social Security Survivors benefits awarded to widow and children but denied to
widower if his children received benefits); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (disa-
bility insurance benefits were awarded to illegitimate children only if they could prove that
disabled parent contributed to their social support or resided with them); United States
Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (the Food Stamp Act denied eligibility
to any household where unrelated individuals lived together); United States Dep't of Agri-
culture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973) (any person over the age of 18 who was claimed as a




York Court of Appeals has invalidated several public assistance
statutes.6 5
Although it would be unlikely that the courts would resolve
this issue by applying strict scrutiny standards,6 the courts of New
York State could declare the age classification in § 369 1(b) to be
unconstitutional on the basis of a "middle tier" test of equal pro-
tection. 7 Due to the federal prohibition against liens placed
against the estates of those who received Medicaid assistance prior
to their sixty-fifth birthday,68 it appears that New York would
then have to either devise an alternative means of providing for
recoupment or completely abandon its efforts to recover Medicaid
benefit payments.
RONALD D. PLOETZ
65. Lee v. Smith, 43 N.Y.2d 453, 373 N.E.2d 247, 402 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1977), af'g 58
A.D.2d 528, 394 N.Y.S.2d 1021 (1st Dep't 1977), af'g 87 Misc. 2d 1018, 187 N.Y.S.2d 952
(Special Term N.Y. Co. 1976) (Home Relief benefits denied until the recipient had filed
support proceeding against all responsible relatives); Tucker v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 1, 371
N.E.2d 449, 400 N.Y.S.2d 728, (1977) af'g 89 Misc. 2d 116, 390 N.Y.S.2d 794 (Sup. Ct.
Monroe Co. 1977) (Supplemental Security Income recipients were often entitled to less total
benefits than if they received assistance under the state welfare programs).
66. See note 44 & accompanying text supra.
67. See notes 48-59 & accompanying text supra.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (a) (18) (1965).
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